Application of section 94(1)(a) RTI Act

Relevant considerations

1. Is the application 'frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance'?

a) 'Frivolous'

The Information Commissioner has not yet made any decisions concerning 'frivolous' applications under the RTI Act.

b) 'Vexatious'

The term 'vexatious' is not defined in the IP Act, RTI Act or the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld). In Underwood and Department of Communities and Minister for Community Services and Housing,1 the RTI Commissioner considered that an external review application under the RTI Act which causes serious and unjustified trouble and harassment will ordinarily be vexatious however there must be regard to the words of the statute in the context of the particular circumstances of the case.2 An application that is productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment is one which gives cause for apprehension without good cause or reason.3

In determining whether an application is vexatious, it is also appropriate to ensure the benefits of the applicant continuing to have the opportunity to seek review are clearly outweighed by considerations involving the proper use of OIC's resources and any unfairness to the agency or Minister.4

c) 'Misconceived'

An application may be 'misconceived' when the type of relief sought cannot be granted under the RTI Act.5

The term 'misconceived' in relation to a complaint, was described by Carr J in McGlade v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and Another6 as:

…facts which would undoubtedly deny the complainant relief, that the complaint is so hopeless that it should be summarily brought to an end.

d) 'Lacking in substance'

In deVere Lawyers and Whitsunday Regional Council,7 the Assistant Commissioner identified a number of cases in various jurisdictions that have considered the meaning of 'lacking in substance'. While these cases considered the term within the context of complaints made under anti-discrimination legislation, the tests formulated provide guidance in determining whether an application is 'lacking in substance' under the RTI Act, as both statutes are remedial in nature.8

In Ebber and Another v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and Others,9 Drummond J held that a complainant must show he has 'more than a remote possibility of a well-founded claim' to defeat an application for summary dismissal. Further, Ormiston JA in State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Rabel10 found that a complaint would be lacking in substance if the complainant has 'no arguable case'. In this case, Ormiston JA also cited Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners11 where Dixon J stated that a litigant's right to procedural fairness should only be deprived where the plaintiff's claim is 'so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed'.

It was noted in deVere Lawyers and Whitsunday Regional Council12 that it is important to always have regard to 'the words of the statute in the context of the particular circumstances of the case'.13

2. Should the discretion to not deal with the application be exercised?

In determining whether to exercise discretion to not deal with vexatious applications, the RTI Commissioner considered the relevant question is not whether OIC and the agency have the necessary resources to resolve the external reviews but whether it is a proper use of those resources to continue to deal with the external review applications.14

In Underwood15 the RTI Commissioner was satisfied the benefits of the applicant continuing to have the opportunity to seek review were clearly outweighed by considerations of fairness to the agency and the proper use of the agency and OIC's resources.

  • 1 Underwood and Department of Communities and Minister for Community Services and Housing (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 9 February 2012) at paragraph 12. (This decision is currently under appeal in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal) [up]
  • 2 deVere Lawyers and Whitsunday Regional Council (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 19 March 2009) at page 4 referring to Assal v Department of Health Housing and Community Services (1992) EOC 92-409 at page 78. In that decision OIC considered whether an application was lacking substance under section 77(1)(a) of the (repealed) Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Qld) which is equivalent to section 94(1)(a) of the RTI Act. [up]
  • 3 Underwood and Department of Communities (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 9 February 2012) at paragraph 14. (See footnote 1) [up]
  • 4 Underwood and Department of Communities (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 9 February 2012) at paragraph 12. (See footnote 1) [up]
  • 5 (Unpublished OIC Decision). [up]
  • 6 McGlade v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and Another [2000] 180 ALR 507. [up]
  • 7 (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 19 March 2009). [up]
  • 8 deVere Lawyers and Whitsunday Regional Council (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 19 March 2009) at page 4. [up]
  • 9 (1995) 129 ALR 455. [up]
  • 10 [1998] 1 VR 102 at page 110. [up]
  • 11 (1949) 78 CLR 62 at paragraphs 91-92. [up]
  • 12 (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 19 March 2009). [up]
  • 13 deVere Lawyers and Whitsunday Regional Council (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 19 March 2009) at page 4 citing Assal v Department of Health Housing and Community Services (1992) EOC 92-409 at paragraph 78. [up]
  • 14 Underwood and Department of Communities (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 9 February 2012) at paragraph 32. (See footnote 1) [up]
  • 15 Underwood and Department of Communities (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 9 February 2012) at paragraph 36. (See footnote 1) [up]

Last updated: March 1, 2012