Pearce and Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority; Various Landholders (Third Parties)
(1998 S0186, 4 November 1999)
In this case the Information Commissioner was required to determine whether the names and addresses of third parties who received financial assistance under the Water Infrastructure Development Incentive Scheme (administered by the respondent authority), and the dollar amount of financial assistance they received, comprised exempt matter under s.44(1), s.45(l)(c) or s.46(1) of the FOI Act.
The Information Commissioner found that, in relation to those third parties which were corporations, the matter in issue which comprised the names of the corporations could not properly be characterised as information concerning the 'personal affairs of a person', and accordingly, that matter did not qualify for exemption under s.44(1) of the FOI Act. The Information Commissioner made the same finding in relation to a third party who was identified by reference to the name of a family trust. In relation to those third parties who were identified by reference to their individual names, the Information Commissioner found that the only information that would be revealed by disclosure of their names was the fact that they were recipients of financial assistance under a government grants scheme administered by the respondent, and that that information was properly to be characterised as information concerning the business or commercial affairs of those third parties, rather than information concerning their personal affairs. Accordingly, the Information Commissioner found that that matter did not qualify for exemption under s.44(1) of the FOI Act.
In relation to the matter in issue which comprised the addresses of the third parties, the Information Commissioner found that in some instances (namely, where the matter in issue comprised the name of a homestead/property and its address, as opposed to a post office box address), while the address comprised information concerning the business affairs of the third party, disclosure of the address, in conjunction with its adjoining name, would incidentally disclose information which concerned the personal affairs of an identifiable third party. The Information Commissioner therefore found this matter prima facie exempt from disclosure under s.44(1) of the FOI Act.
In considering the application of the public interest balancing test incorporated in s.44(l), the Information Commissioner found that the public interest in disclosure of information which would permit scrutiny of the geographical distribution of the funding available under the Scheme would be adequately served by disclosure of the postcodes only.
In relation to the matter in issue which comprised the dollar amount of financial assistance received by the third parties, the Information Commissioner found that this matter could not properly be characterised as information concerning the personal affairs of the respective third parties, and that it therefore did not qualify for exemption under s.44(1) of the FOI Act. As to the application of s.45(1)(c), the Information Commissioner found that disclosure of the matter in issue could not reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the business, commercial or financial affairs of the third parties, or to prejudice the future supply to government of such information. The Information Commissioner stated that, even had he been satisfied that the matter in issue met the requirements for exemption under s.45(l)(c)(i) and (ii) of the FOI Act, there would have been substantial public interest considerations favouring disclosure of the matter in issue (namely, the proper accountability of the respondent for the distribution of public funds) which would have warranted a finding that disclosure of the particular matter in issue would, on balance, be in the public interest.
As to the application of s.46(1) of the FOI Act, the Information Commissioner found that there was no express assurance sought or given to the effect that the names and addresses of the third parties would be treated in confidence by the respondent, either as against the applicant, or the world at large. The Information Commissioner also found that equity would not bind the respondent with an enforceable obligation of confidence, restraining it from disclosing the matter in issue. The Information Commissioner therefore found that the matter in issue did not qualify for exemption under s.46(1)(a) of the FOI Act. As to s.46(l)(b), the Information Commissioner found that the matter in issue was not communicated to the respondent in confidence and that disclosure of the matter in issue could not reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of such information to government.
