



Decision and Reasons for Decision

Citation:	Stiles and Queensland Urban Utilities [2021] QICmr 5 (16 February 2021)
Application Number:	314600
Applicant:	Stiles
Respondent:	Queensland Urban Utilities
Decision Date:	16 February 2021
Catchwords:	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT - REFUSAL OF ACCESS - EXEMPT INFORMATION - LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE - information about applicant's dispute with agency - communications between the agency's internal legal advisors and agency officers - whether information would be privileged from production in a legal proceeding - dominant purpose of communications - whether in-house legal advice was independent - Schedule 3, section 7 of the <i>Right to Information Act 2009</i> (Qld) and section 67(1) of the <i>Information Privacy Act 2009</i> (Qld) – whether access may be refused under section 47(3)(a) of the <i>Right to Information Act 2009</i> (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Summary

1. The applicant applied to Queensland Urban Utilities (**QUU**) under the *Information Privacy Act 2009* (Qld) (**IP Act**) for access to documents relating to his property and his account with QUU.¹
2. In relation to the documents located, QUU decided² to:
 - grant access to 327 pages
 - refuse access to 44 part-pages on the basis that disclosure, would, on balance be contrary to the public interest pursuant to section 47(3)(b) of the *Right to Information Act 2009* (Qld) (**RTI Act**)³
 - refuse access to six part-pages and 152 whole pages pursuant to schedule 3, section 7 of the RTI Act; and

¹ For the time period 1 July 2014 to 21 December 2018.

² Decision dated 29 January 2019.

³ Section 67 of the IP Act provides that access to information may be refused on the same grounds as under section 47 of the RTI Act. This decision will refer to the relevant RTI Act grounds for refusal.

- delete eight part-pages on the basis the information was not relevant to the applicant's access application.⁴
3. On internal review, QUU upheld its original decision, however it did locate further documents which it disclosed to the applicant.⁵
 4. In relation to the further documents located by QUU, QUU decided to:
 - grant access to 8 pages; and
 - refuse access to 7 part-pages on the ground that disclosure, would on balance be contrary to the public interest pursuant to section 47(3)(b) of the RTI Act.
 5. The applicant applied to the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) for external review of this decision.⁶
 6. During the external review process, the applicant raised concerns about the sufficiency of the searches undertaken by QUU to locate documents in response to his access application. At OIC's behest QUU conducted further searches and located additional documents which were disclosed to the applicant.⁷ Accordingly, the applicant's sufficiency of search concerns were resolved during the external review process and do not form part of this decision.
 7. For the reasons set out below, I vary QUU's decision and find that access to three pages and four part-pages is refused on the grounds that it is subject to legal professional privilege and accordingly is exempt from disclosure under sections 47(3)(a) and schedule 3, section 7 of the RTI Act.

Background

8. The applicant had a longstanding dispute with QUU concerning his driveway. In an effort to resolve the dispute QUU entered into a confidential settlement with the applicant.⁸ Subsequently, the applicant made a complaint to QUU about perceived delays in QUU complying with the terms of the settlement agreement.
9. Significant procedural steps in the external review are set out in the Appendix to this decision.

Reviewable decision

10. The decision under review is QUU's internal review decision dated 26 March 2019.

Evidence considered

11. The evidence, submissions, legislation and other material I have considered in reaching this decision are disclosed in these reasons (including footnotes and appendices).

⁴ Section 88 of the IP Act. Although I note that the marked-up copy of the documents provided to OIC on 31 May 2019 refers to the information as being 'out of scope'.

⁵ Internal review decision dated 26 March 2019.

⁶ External review application received on 2 May 2019.

⁷ Consisting of 85 pages initially provided to the applicant on 23 August 2019. Information located by QUU as a result of further searches – comprising 161 pages disclosed to the applicant on 19 February 2020 – "Attachment 1B" and "Attachment 1C".

⁸ QUU's letter to OIC dated 31 May 2019.

Human Rights Act

12. I have also had regard to the *Human Rights Act 2019* (Qld) (**HR Act**),⁹ particularly the right to seek and receive information.¹⁰ I consider a decision-maker will be '*respecting and acting compatibly with*' that right and others prescribed in the HR Act, when applying the law prescribed in the IP Act and the RTI Act.¹¹ I have acted in this way in making this decision, in accordance with section 58(1) of the HR Act. I also note the observations made by Bell J on the interaction between equivalent pieces of Victorian legislation¹²: '*it is perfectly compatible with the scope of that positive right in the Charter for it to be observed by reference to the scheme of, and principles in, the Freedom of Information Act.*'¹³

Information in issue

13. On external review, OIC facilitated the release of additional information to which QUU had previously refused access as follows:¹⁴
- 50 part-pages, comprising the names, email addresses and landline phone numbers of QUU employees;¹⁵ and
 - 12 part-pages and 143 full pages, comprising communications that were not subject to legal professional privilege.¹⁶
14. In relation to the remaining information to which QUU refused access on the ground that disclosure would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest (**contrary to the public interest information**),¹⁷ the applicant indicated in the course of the external review that he did not seek access to that information.¹⁸ Accordingly, the contrary to the public interest information does not form part of this external review decision.
15. As noted above, during the external review, the applicant raised several concerns about the sufficiency of QUU's searches to locate documents responsive to his access application. As a result, OIC requested QUU to conduct searches for further documents on three occasions. QUU located further documents which were disclosed to the applicant. Accordingly, the applicant's sufficiency of search concerns were resolved during the external review process.
16. The only information that remains to be addressed in this decision therefore is the information which was claimed to be exempt information on the ground of legal professional privilege.¹⁹ The number of pages subject to this exemption claim was reduced during the external review, when, in the interests of informally resolving the review, QUU decided to waive privilege to 24 pages and provided the applicant with

⁹ The HR Act came into force on 1 January 2020.

¹⁰ Section 21 of the HR Act.

¹¹ *XYZ v Victoria Police (General)* [2010] VCAT 255 (16 March 2010) (**XYZ**) at [573]; *Horrocks v Department of Justice (General)* [2012] VCAT 241 (2 March 2012) at [111].

¹² *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Vic) and the *Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006* (Vic).

¹³ *XYZ* at [573].

¹⁴ This also includes 16 pages that QUU indicated that it intended to waive legal professional privilege to. Letter to OIC dated 31 May 2019.

¹⁵ On the basis that this information comprises routine personal work information and therefore disclosure would not, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.

¹⁶ On the basis that the information did not comprise exempt information pursuant to schedule 3, section 7 of the RTI Act.

¹⁷ Comprising information at pages 154, 229, 233, 234, 235, 299, 332, 333, 334, 339, 341, 342, 345, 346, 348, 349, 354, 355, 356, 360, 363, 368, 391, 392, 413, 564, 565, 583 and 584 of Attachment 1A and pages 43, 48, 51, 52, 56, 58, 64, 69, 70, 72, 74, 76, 77, 82, 85, 89, 93, 94, 95, 98, 100, 102, 110, 112, 113, 143, 144, 149 and 150 of Attachment 1C. Provided to the applicant by QUU on 19 February 2020.

¹⁸ Email to OIC dated 6 October 2020.

¹⁹ Schedule 3, section 7 of the RTI Act.

copies of those communications. Consequently, the **Information in Issue** for the purposes of this decision is three whole pages²⁰ and four part-pages which are claimed to be subject to legal professional privilege and therefore exempt from disclosure.²¹

Issue for determination

17. Accordingly, in this decision, the question for consideration is whether access to the Information in Issue may be refused on the basis that it comprises exempt information.²²

Relevant law

18. The IP Act confers on an individual a right to access documents of an agency, to the extent they contain the individual's personal information.²³ However, this right of access is subject to limitations, including grounds for refusal of access.²⁴ Access may be refused to documents to the extent that they comprise exempt information.²⁵ Schedule 3 of the RTI Act sets out categories of information the disclosure of which Parliament has determined to be contrary to the public interest, and therefore exempt from disclosure.²⁶
19. Schedule 3, section 7 of the RTI Act provides that information will be exempt from disclosure if it would be privileged from production in a legal proceeding on the ground of legal professional privilege. This exemption reflects the requirements of establishing legal professional privilege at common law.²⁷
20. Legal professional privilege attaches to confidential communications between a lawyer and client made for the dominant purpose of seeking or giving legal advice or professional legal assistance (advice privilege), or preparing for, or for use, in or in relation to, existing or reasonably anticipated legal proceedings (litigation privilege).²⁸ When these requirements are met, legal professional privilege is established. Qualifications and exceptions may, in particular circumstances, affect whether information attracts or remains subject to legal professional privilege.²⁹
21. Legal professional privilege may protect communications between salaried employee legal advisors of a government department or statutory authority and his/her employer as the client (including communications through other employees of the same employer) provided there is a professional relationship of legal advisor and client, which secures to the advice an independent character, notwithstanding the employment.³⁰

Findings

Confidential communications and Dominant purpose

22. The information in Issue consists of:

²⁰ Pages 475-476 and 494 of Attachment 1A redacted from the information disclosed to the applicant on 19 February 2020.

²¹ Pages 473, 474, 490 and 522 of Attachment 1A redacted from the information disclosed to the applicant on 19 February 2020.

²² Sections 47(3)(a), 48 and schedule 3 section 7 of the RTI Act.

²³ Section 40(1)(a) of the IP Act. Section 12 of the IP Act defines personal information as '*information or an opinion, including information or an opinion forming part of a database, whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion*'.

²⁴ Grounds for refusal of access are set out in section 47 of the RTI Act. Section 67(1) of the IP Act provides that access to information may be refused under the IP Act on the same grounds as in section 47 of the RTI Act.

²⁵ Section 47(3)(a) of the RTI Act.

²⁶ Section 48(2) of the RTI Act.

²⁷ *Ozcare and Department of Justice and Attorney-General* (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 13 May 2011) at [12].

²⁸ *Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commission of Taxation* (1999) 201 CLR 49; *Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission* (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [9].

²⁹ Such as waiver or improper purpose.

³⁰ *Waterford v Commonwealth* (1986) 163 CLR 54 (**Waterford**) at 95 per Mason and Wilson JJ.

- communications between a QUU in-house legal advisor and a QUU Stakeholder Engagement Coordinator; and
 - a communication from a QUU in-house legal advisor to multiple recipients within QUU, namely an officer in Commercial Recovery, a Stakeholder Engagement Coordinator and other QUU employees within the Finance Department.³¹
23. In each communication advice is sought or provided in relation to the dispute with the applicant. Legal advice has been broadly interpreted to extend to all '*professional advice as to what a party should prudently or sensibly do in the relevant context*'.³²
24. The applicant submits:³³
- On further inspection of Page 490, at the bottom of the page below the redaction there appears an email signature where the logo appears larger than the Special Council's [sic] full email and signature logo appearing at the top of the same page.*
- This larger size email signature logo also appears on Page 493 and Page 480 in the email signature of [a Stakeholder Engagement Coordinator].*
- Page 493 is the first page of the email chain that starts with a purely commercial account request from [a Stakeholder Engagement Coordinator].*
- Therefore it is obvious to me that the redacted email on Page 490 is authored by [a Stakeholder Engagement Officer] and not authored by the Special Council [sic].*
25. I understand from the applicant's submission that he is contending that if a communication is not authored by a legal advisor it cannot be subject to legal professional privilege, as he believes the email was authored by a QUU Stakeholder Engagement Coordinator.
26. Legal professional privilege does not only protect communications **from** a legal advisor, it will also protect communications **to** a legal advisor if the three requirements for legal professional privilege are satisfied. I am satisfied that the three requirements for legal professional privilege are made out in relation to the part of page 490,³⁴ to which the applicant refers, namely:
- the communication was made in the course of a lawyer-client relationship
 - the communication was and remains confidential; and
 - the communication was made for the dominant purpose of seeking or providing legal advice or for use in existing or reasonably anticipated legal proceedings.
27. In reaching the conclusion that the communication at page 490 satisfies the three requirements for legal professional privilege, I have taken into account that the communication was created for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice and was created in the course of a professional relationship, namely that the in-house legal adviser was being consulted in his/her professional capacity as a lawyer. Further there is no evidence that the communication has been disclosed to the applicant nor to any other party outside of QUU and therefore was and remains confidential.

³¹ I am satisfied that this communication accords with the findings in *TEC Headland Pty Ltd v The Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd* [2020] WASC 364 at [26] and [29] in relation to a communication from a lawyer to more than one addressee that contains legal advice.

³² *ABW Ltd v Cole (No 5)* (2006) 155 FCR 30 at page 45.

³³ Email to OIC dated 22 April 2020.

³⁴ Contained in Attachment 1A, which QUU disclosed to the applicant on 19 February 2020.

28. Similarly, the applicant also submits:³⁵

Pages 475 and 476 redacted are 2 pages of an email chain where both pages are completely redacted from what appears to be at least two authors.

29. I understand from the applicant's submission he is contending that legal professional privilege does not attach to communications involving more than one author. By its very nature, an email chain would usually have more than one author. As noted at paragraph [26], legal professional privilege does not only protect communications **from** a legal advisor, it may also protect communications **to** a legal advisor if the three requirements for legal professional privilege are satisfied. I am satisfied that the pages redacted from the email chain comprise communications to and from a legal advisor, in which the dominant purpose of the communication is to seek or provide legal advice.

30. Alternatively, the applicant may be contending that privilege to the communications may have been waived on the basis the communications have been disseminated within QUU and are therefore no longer confidential. Legal professional privilege extends to internal communications which forward or repeat legal advice or requests for legal advice, whether verbatim or in substance. Consequently, I find that the circulation of communications which convey or record privileged communications among relevant officers within an entity such as QUU are necessary in order for the entity to seek and consider legal advice and does not constitute waiver of privilege.³⁶

31. Further the applicant submits:³⁷

On Page 490 the redaction appears to be an email from [a Stakeholder Engagement Coordinator]. Up until the point of the redaction in the email, the dominate [sic] purpose of the email chain is a request for account details of a commercial nature.

No date is shown at the top of Page 490 even though To and Subject are shown. No legal advice is requested or legal work recorded in the email chain pages shown.

Pages 473 and 474 part redacted are 2 pages of an email chain where the email has no legal advice requested and the dominate [sic] purpose is the recording of phone discussions.

Page 522 part redacted is the first page of a 2 page email chain where the dominate [sic] purpose is the documenting of a phone discussion regarding account payment of a commercial nature. No legal advice is requested or legal work recorded in the email chain pages shown.

32. I understand from the applicant's submission, that he is contending that as the parts of the email chains disclosed to the applicant record telephone discussions or request account details and therefore were not created for the dominant purpose of seeking or providing legal advice, that all of the communications within the email chain should be disclosed to him.

33. While legal professional privilege can apply to the entirety of a chain of emails, legal professional privilege can also attach to an individual communication within a chain of emails. I am satisfied that the communications that have been redacted from the email chains were made for the dominant purpose of seeking or providing legal advice.

³⁵ Email to OIC dated 5 May 2020.

³⁶ The following cases regarding circulation of privileged information within a corporation are analogous: *Komacha v Orange City Council* (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 30 August 1979); *Brambles Holdings Ltd v Trade Practices Commission* (No.3) (1981) 58 FLR 452 at 458-459; *GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd* [2000] FCA 593 at [9]-[10]; *Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Merck & Co Ltd* [2004] FCA 1131; *Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd* [2005] FCA 864 at [56]; and *Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd* [2005] FCA 1342 at [26].

³⁷ Email to OIC dated 5 May 2020.

34. Based on the above, I am satisfied that the Information in Issue comprises confidential communications between in-house legal advisors and other QUU officers made for the dominant purpose of seeking or giving legal advice.

Professional relationship and independence

35. The applicant submitted that he does not consider that legal professional privilege attaches to communications to and from in house legal advisors.³⁸
36. The High Court of Australia has established that legal professional privilege may protect communications between salaried employee legal advisors of a government department or statutory authority and his/her employer as client (including communications through other employees of the same employer) provided there is a professional relationship of legal advisor and client, which secures to the advice an independent character notwithstanding the employment.³⁹ The Information Commissioner has consistently applied this reasoning when considering the position of legal officers employed within Queensland government agencies.⁴⁰
37. A lawyer employed by a government agency or an ‘in-house’ lawyer may claim privilege on behalf of his or her employer as the client.⁴¹ However, an in-house lawyer will not have the required degree of independence if their advice is affected by their personal loyalties, duties and interests.⁴²
38. Having reviewed the Information in Issue, I note that in each instance the legal advice was provided directly between the legal advisor and the respective officer within the Chief Executive Office or Commercial Recovery unit. There is no evidence before me to indicate that the advice was provided in a manner that differed from the usual practice of obtaining and/or providing in-house legal advice. I also note that having considered all of the information located by QUU in response to the applicant’s access application, there is nothing to suggest that in providing the advice comprised in the Information in Issue, the in-house legal advisors were subject to duress or interference arising from their employment relationships.
39. I am satisfied that the legal advisors who provided the legal advice (comprised in the Information in Issue) were appropriately qualified legal practitioners who provided the advice with the requisite degree of independence from QUU.
40. The applicant further submitted:⁴³

On Page 107 of Attachment 1C dated 11 September 2015 [QUU Officer’s] email signature states Senior Legal Council [sic] OCEO.

On Page 531 dated 23 November 2015, in the first email from [QUU Officer], the signature states Special Council [sic] and Acting Board Secretary of the OCEO below the statement “general carriage of the various issues”. Acting Board Secretary implies a commercial role.

On Page 132 of Attachment 1C the email draws a clear distinction between OCEO and Legal Services Team.

³⁸ Telephone discussion with OIC on 9 October 2019.

³⁹ *Waterford* per Mason and Wilson JJ at paragraph 7 of their Honours’ judgment.

⁴⁰ *Potter and Brisbane City Council* (1994) QAR 37; *F60XCX and Department of Natural Resources and Mines* [2017] QICmr 19 (9 June 2017); *Gapsa and Department of Transport and Main Roads* (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 12 April 2013); *Hillier and Redland City Council* (Unreported, Queensland Information Commissioner, 9 June 2011).

⁴¹ *Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney* (1985) 158 CLR 500 at 530-531.

⁴² *Seven Network News v News Ltd* (2005) 225 ALR 672 at 674.

⁴³ Email to OIC dated 22 April 2020.

41. From this submission, I understand the applicant is contending that QUU Counsel was not acting as a legal advisor in the documents that *have* been disclosed to him and therefore by implication QUU Counsel was not providing legal advice in the communications that *have not* been disclosed to him.
42. I do not consider that the changes in the job title of QUU Counsel, changed the role played by Counsel in the communications, namely that of legal advisor, such that the communications are no longer subject to legal professional privilege.⁴⁴
43. Having reviewed the Information in Issue, I am satisfied that the communications were made in the course of a lawyer-client relationship and that Counsel was acting in a legal capacity.
44. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the Information in Issue meets each of the requirements of legal professional privilege. Accordingly, I find that the Information in Issue is exempt information, on the basis that it would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege, and therefore access to it may be refused under section 47(3)(a) of the RTI Act.

DECISION

45. I vary the decision under review and find that access to three pages and four part-pages is refused on the grounds that it is subject to legal professional privilege and accordingly is exempt from disclosure under sections 47(3)(a) and schedule 3, section 7 of the RTI Act.
46. I have made this decision as a delegate of the Information Commissioner, under section 139 of the IP Act.

Assistant Information Commissioner Corby

Date: 16 February 2021

⁴⁴ *Aquila Coal Pty Ltd v Bowen Central Coal Pty Ltd* [2013] QSC 82.

APPENDIX: SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL STEPS

Date	Event
2 May 2019	OIC received the application for external review of QUU's decision.
3 May 2019	OIC notified the applicant and QUU that the application had been received and requested procedural documents from QUU.
13 May 2019	OIC received the requested documents from QUU.
15 May 2019	OIC informed the applicant and QUU that the application for external review had been accepted. OIC requested QUU to provide the documentation relevant to the application.
31 May 2019	OIC received the documents relevant to the application from QUU.
12 June and 12 July 2019	OIC updated the applicant.
23 July 2019 and 26 July 2019	OIC provided the applicant with an update by telephone and discussed the applicant's sufficiency of search concern.
29 July 2019	OIC received an email from the applicant providing copies of the attachments referred to in his external review application.
5 August 2019	OIC conveyed a preliminary view to QUU. OIC also requested QUU carry out further searches in response to the applicant's sufficiency of search concern.
20 August 2019	OIC provided the applicant with an update by telephone.
23 August 2019	Response to OIC's preliminary view received from QUU.
5 September 2019	The applicant contacted OIC to raise concerns about the further information released to him by QUU and raising further sufficiency of search concerns.
10 September 2019	OIC required QUU to provide OIC with a copy of the further information provided to the applicant. OIC also requested QUU carry out further searches in response to the applicant's sufficiency of search concerns.
11 September 2019	OIC provided an update to the applicant.
18 September 2019	OIC received a response from QUU to the queries raised during the telephone call on 10 September 2019.
27 September 2019	The applicant contacted OIC requesting an update.
30 September 2019	OIC received an email from the applicant, detailing his concerns about the further information disclosed to him by QUU.
2 October 2019	OIC received a telephone call from the applicant to discuss his concerns.
9 October and 21 October 2019	OIC provided the applicant with an update.
8 November 2019	OIC conveyed a further preliminary view to QUU, requested QUU to release additional information and carry out further searches.

Date	Event
2 December 2019	OIC received QUU's response to OIC's further preliminary view dated 8 November 2019.
6 December 2019	OIC wrote to the applicant to provide an update.
29 January 2020	OIC wrote to QUU requiring release of documents and further information.
29 January 2020	OIC wrote to the applicant to provide an update.
19 February 2020	OIC received QUU's response to its letter dated 29 January 2020.
28 February 2020	OIC wrote to QUU to ascertain whether in releasing the further information to the applicant, it had waived privilege to 24 pages of information.
3 March 2020	OIC received confirmation from QUU that it had waived privilege to 24 pages of information.
4 March 2020	<p>OIC conveyed a preliminary view to the applicant that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> access may be refused to 28 pages and 5 part-pages on the basis the information comprised exempt information⁴⁵ QUU had taken reasonable steps to locate any further information in response to the applicant's sufficiency of search concerns; and the dates on which emails had been sent had been disclosed to the applicant. <p>OIC also provided the applicant with an explanation in relation to his concerns that pages were missing from the documents disclosed to him by QUU.</p>
17 March 2020 to 22 April 2020	Various correspondence between OIC and the applicant in which the applicant sought and received clarification about the documents released to him by QUU and requested extensions in which to provide submissions.
22 April 2020 and 5 May 2020	OIC received submissions from the applicant.
6 May 2020	OIC wrote to QUU requesting it release missing pages from email chains referred to by the applicant.
19 May 2020	OIC received a response from QUU.
27 May 2020	<p>OIC wrote to QUU requesting it to release the duplicate copies of information to the applicant (subject to the redaction of information subject to legal professional privilege).</p> <p>OIC conveyed a second preliminary view to the applicant.</p>
28 May 2020	OIC received confirmation from QUU that it had disclosed the duplicate copies of information to the applicant.
5 June 2020	OIC received an email from the applicant seeking clarification of the views provided in OIC's second preliminary view dated 27 May 2020.

⁴⁵ Although OIC acknowledged that QUU had waived privilege to some of this information and provided its view that access may be refused to the remaining information (Information in Issue).

Date	Event
15 June 2020	OIC wrote to QUU requesting it to forward a further copy of a duplicate email to the applicant.
16 June 2020	OIC received confirmation from QUU that it had disclosed a further copy of the duplicate email to the applicant.
16 June to 13 July 2020	Various correspondence between OIC and the applicant, in which the applicant sought and received clarification about comments in OIC's preliminary view and OIC's process.
23 July 2020	OIC provided an update to the applicant.
18 August 2020	OIC contacted QUU to provide an update. QUU indicated that it may be willing to offer an informal resolution proposal.
19 August to 26 August 2020	Various correspondence between OIC and QUU, in which OIC clarified the information remaining in issue.
28 August 2020	OIC wrote to the applicant advising of QUU's informal resolution proposal.
4 September to 8 September 2020	Various correspondence between OIC, the applicant and QUU in relation to the redaction of a signature block that the applicant sought access to.
11 September to 14 September 2020	Various correspondence between OIC and the applicant in relation to the applicant's proposed counteroffer to QUU's informal resolution proposal.
17 September 2020	OIC contacted QUU to advise it of the applicant's counteroffer in relation to its informal resolution proposal.
18 September 2020	OIC received an email from QUU in which it stated it did not agree to the applicant's counteroffer.
28 September 2020	OIC provided an update to the applicant.
6 October to 26 October 2020	Various correspondence between OIC and the applicant in which the applicant sought and received clarification about the content of OIC's letters dated 11 September 2020 and 28 September 2020.